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A ‘Margin of Appreciation’ in the Internal 
Market: Lessons from the European Court of 
Human Rights
By James A. Sweeney*
Abstract
This article charts the interplay between universality and particularism in the 
approach of the European Court of Justice to national restrictions upon the 
four freedoms. Comparisons are made with the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights. It is shown that both courts allow a national ‘margin 
of appreciation’ within which overlapping European and local public interests 
can be balanced. The article draws inspiration from research into the impact 
of the margin of appreciation upon the universality of human rights in order 
to understand the potential of the doctrine for the enlarged European Union. 
The doctrine is placed within a normative framework based upon the European 
Union as an ‘essentially contested’ project. The use of the doctrine by the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice is analysed then in the light of this framework, with 
particular emphasis placed upon the existence of outer limits to the doctrine, 
and the factors that guide its width.
1. Introduction
The enlarged European Union presents a complex moral landscape in which 
the Union may struggle either to construct or to maintain its own culture 
and identity whilst respecting that of its Member States.1 The question this 
article seeks to examine is how possible tensions between ‘European’ aims and 
Member States’ moral and cultural values have been handled by the European 
Court of Justice when it examines limitations to the economic freedoms upon 
which the Community was founded.2
* Lecturer, Department of Law, Durham University (UK). Thank you to Ian Ward and Stephen 
Weatherill, who read and commented upon an earlier draft of this work. The usual disclaimer 
applies.
1. See I. Ward, ‘The Culture of Enlargement’ (2005) 12 Columbia Journal of European Law 199.
2. Similar issues have arisen in respect of state aids, but will not be discussed here; E. Psychogiopou-
lou, ‘EC State Aid Control and Cultural Justifications’ (2006) 33 Legal Issues of Economic Integra-
tion 3.
Legal Issues of Economic Integration 34(1): 27–52, 2007.
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This article shows that the European Court of Justice has actually taken a 
rather similar approach to the European Court of Human Rights, by recognis-
ing a ‘margin of appreciation’ when morally and culturally sensitive matters are 
at issue.3 Although the impact that morally sensitive matters may have upon 
the principle of proportionality is recognised in Community law,4 the role and 
impact of the margin of appreciation itself is more nebulous. The jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights applying the margin of appreciation 
doctrine has been subject to considerable scrutiny from the perspective of 
tensions between universality and particularism, and so its examination holds 
valuable lessons in this regard for the European Court of Justice.5   
The first purpose of this article is to establish that both courts, in fact, 
use the margin of appreciation doctrine. Part Two therefore introduces the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) and then 
isolates commonalities within the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (‘ECJ’). 
Part Three sketches a normative framework within which the margin of ap-
preciation doctrine can be situated, stressing its role in an ‘essentially contested’ 
European Union (‘EU’). Part Four then examines the doctrine in operation 
against this framework. The doctrine is poised to play a very important role 
in the enlarged EU.  
2.  Identifying the ‘Margin of Appreciation’
2.1. The International Character of the Margin of Appreciation 
The question of establishing how deferential courts should be to executive 
and legislative bodies is a familiar one in many aspects of domestic public law. 
There are commonalities with the English law on Wednesbury unreasonable-
ness and in the USA.6 The doctrine has clear counterparts in many civil law 
3. S. Hall, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and Public Policy Exceptions to the 
Free Movement of Workers Under the EEC Treaty’, (1991) 16 European Law Review 466, 481; 
Y. Shany, ‘Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International law? (2005) 16 
European Journal of International Law 907, 928.
4. See e.g. J. Jans, ‘Proportionality Revisited’ (2000) 27 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 239, 
245.
5. The comparisons made here between the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
and the European Court of Justice are thus not on the substantive protection of human rights, but 
on what both courts’ use of the margin of appreciation doctrine reveals about their approaches to 
universality and particularism; cf S. Douglas-Scott, ‘A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Stras-
bourg and the Growing European Human Rights Aquis’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 
629.
6. See D. L. Donoho, ‘Autonomy, Self-governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: Developing a 
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jurisdictions,7 notably France and Germany.8 Judicial deference, in these 
circumstances, is justified on democratic grounds, and reflects concerns about 
maintaining the separation of powers.  
The focus of this article is upon cases that involve the review of Member 
States’ conduct by the ECJ and ECtHR. The distinctive feature of the mar-
gin of appreciation doctrine analysed here is that, in addition to meeting the 
separation of powers concerns that affect all courts, there is the further issue of 
the relationship between national and international (or supranational) bodies.9 
Indeed, in the UK’s domestic case law under the Human Rights Act 1998, 
it has been recognised that the margin of appreciation doctrine will play no 
role.10 This reinforces the international character of the doctrine and thus, in 
its international incarnation, the doctrine raises normative questions about the 
relationship between national values and European or universal rights. 
2.2. The ECHR and Local Values
Most standard texts on the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) 
recognise that the margin of appreciation plays a role in a huge number of the 
Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human Rights’ (2001) 15 Emory International Law 
Review 391, 443 et seq for explicit comparisons between the European ‘margin of appreciation’ 
doctrine and the practice of the US Supreme Court; note also the federal courts’ application of 
the ‘political question doctrine’, K. L. Boyd, ‘Are Human Rights Political Questions?’ (2001) 53 
Rutgers Law Review 277. 
7. Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the 
Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia, Oxford, 2002), 3; H. Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence (Kluwer, The Hague, 1996), 
14. 
8. Y. Arai-Takahashi, ‘Discretion in German Administrative Law: Doctrinal Discourse Revisited’ 
(2000) 6 European Public Law 69. 
9. E. Brems, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-law of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights’ (1996) 56 Zeitschrift fur Auslandisches offenthiches recht und volkerrecht 240, 293; Jans 
(note 4) 241–242; J. A. Sweeney, ‘Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European 
Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War era’ (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 459, 472.
10. R v. DPP Ex parte Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326, 380, per Lord Hope; Brown v. Stott [2003] 1 AC 
681, 711, per Lord Steyn; International Transport Roth GmbH v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2003] QB 728, 765, per Laws LJ; on the inapplicability of the margin of appreciation 
to national law see T. H. Jones, ‘The devaluation of human rights under the European Convention’ 
(1995) Public Law 430; R. Singh, ‘Is There a Role for the “Margin of Appreciation” in National 
Law after the Human Rights Act’ (1999) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 15; J. A. Sweeney, 
‘Domestic Judicial Deference and the ECHR in the UK and Netherlands’ (2003) 11 Tilburg 
Foreign Law Review 439, 444.
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ECtHR’s cases.11 It is a ‘key concept’12 in determining whether limitations 
upon human rights are necessary in a democratic society. Indeed, it is the 
sheer wealth of case law and commentary on the ECtHR’s use of the margin 
of appreciation that promotes its study as being useful for analysing the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence. 
The use of the concept has arisen from cases concerning derogations in 
times of war of public emergency. However, it is the appearance of the margin 
in non-emergency cases that is the most relevant here. 
The ECtHR usually adopts a three-stage process to examining limitations 
upon ‘qualified’ rights.13 Firstly, it requires that a restriction to a Convention 
right is in accordance with or is prescribed by law.14 Secondly, the purpose of 
the restriction must be within the remit of one of the ‘legitimate aims’ specified 
in the relevant article. Finally, the restriction must be necessary in a democratic 
society. However, the ECtHR has recognised that states enjoy a ‘margin of ap-
preciation’ in assessing the necessity of their restriction to Convention rights.  
Perhaps the most often cited reference to the margin of appreciation doc-
trine was made in the 1976 Handyside case, involving Article 10 ECHR on free 
expression. The case concerned restrictions on the publication of a schoolbook 
deemed obscene by the authorities in the United Kingdom. The ECtHR ex-
plained its position thus: 
‘…[I]t is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contract-
ing States a uniform European conception of morals. The view taken by 
their respective laws of the requirements of morals varies from time to 
time and from place to place […]. By reason of their direct and continu-
ous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are 
in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an 
opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on the 
“necessity” of a “restriction” or “penalty” intended to meet them. [….] 
Consequently, Article 10 para. 2 leaves to the Contracting States a margin 
of appreciation. […]’15
11. See e.g. M. Janis et al, European Human Rights Law (2nd Edn OUP, Oxford, 2000), 146 et seq; 
J. Rehman, International Human Rights Law (Pearson Harlow, 2003), 167; H. Steiner and P. 
Alston, International Human Rights in Context (2nd Edn OUP, Oxford, 2000), 854 et seq.
12. J. G. Merrills and A. H. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe (4th Edn Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 2001).
13. C. Ovey and R. White, Jacobs and White – European Convention on Human Rights (OUP, Oxford, 
2002), 201.
14. Kruslin v. France (1990) 12 EHRR 547, para. 27 contains a summary of the approach of Court 
of Human Rights to this aspect of the test. It was discussed in more detail in the earlier case of 
Sunday Times v. UK (1979–80) 2 EHRR 245, para. 47. 
15. Handyside v. UK Series A No. 24 (1979–80) 1 EHRR 737 para. 48.
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The ECtHR allowed the UK’s restriction on the publication of the book, de-
spite the fact that it had been published elsewhere in Europe. It seemed there-
fore that the limitations in the Convention might apply differently from state 
to state, because the requirement of morality do not have the same content in 
each Contracting Party. 
This apparent deference to local values can be seen in a wide range of the 
ECtHR’s judgments. The margin of appreciation thus plays an important role 
in mediating between universality and particularism in the Convention system. 
This aspect of the margin of appreciation doctrine’s use has not been without 
controversy because of perceived relativistic threats to the universality of human 
rights. Before turning to the nature of this controversy and its relevance to the 
EU, the ECJ’s adoption of a comparable method of analysis is established. 
2.3. Restricting the Four Freedoms
The four freedoms relating to the movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital16 hold a position of pre-eminence in the EC Treaty.17 However, de-
spite their relative importance, they are not absolute; internal market law must 
provide exceptions to them. These can be characterised broadly as treaty-based 
justifications (eg Articles 30, 39(3), 46, and 58(1) EC) or case law exceptions 
(e.g. the Cassis ‘mandatory requirements’).18 
There are at least three important issues that are pre-requisite to an explana-
tion of the ECJ’s approach to limiting free movement rights. Firstly, there is 
considerable discussion about the extent to which the approach of the ECJ to 
each of the four freedoms is similar.19 Secondly, whilst there is some agree-
ment that the distinction between treaty and case law justifications is diminish-
ing,20 there are still technical differences between them. However, the purpose 
of this article is to enquire into the use of the margin of appreciation doctrine 
by the ECJ and the resulting approach to balancing European and local values. 
The cases discussed below show that, on this question at least, there is a degree 
of commonality between each of the four freedoms and between the different 
16. Art 14 (2) EC.
17. P. Oliver and W. Roth, ‘The Internal Market and the Four Freedoms’ (2004) 41 Common Market 
Law Review 407, 410.
18. Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] 
ECR 649, para. 8.
19. H. Jarass, ‘A Unified Approach to the Fundamental Freedoms’ in M Andenas & W Roth (eds), 
Services and Free Movement in EU law (OUP, Oxford, 2002), 141.
20. S. O’Leary and J. M. Fernandez-Martin, ‘Judicially Created Exceptions to the Free Provision of 
Services’ in M. Andenas and W. Roth (eds) (note 19), 172; G. Davies, European Union Internal 
Market Law (Cavendish London 2003), 131; P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law 3rd Edn (OUP, 
Oxford, 2003), 660–661.
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categories of exception. Thirdly, the case law since Keck21 also deals with the 
outer limits of free movement.22 Although Keck and other cases on ‘selling ar-
rangements’ may raise questions relating to traditional social practices,23 these 
cases do not share the characteristic discussion of rights and justified exceptions 
such as to render them comparable to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
2.4. The European Court of Justice, the Restrictions and the Margin of 
 Appreciation
Both the treaty exceptions and the case law justifications require the ECJ to 
balance European aims against more local values. Questions about the suitabil-
ity, necessity and proportionality of the national measure are discussed.24 It 
shown here that when confronted with questions about morality, the approach 
of the ECJ is very similar to that taken by the ECtHR in the cases discussed 
above. The ECJ cases presented are not exhaustive of the cases in which the 
margin of appreciation has played a role. The aim is to demonstrate that the 
doctrine plays a role across the different categories of restriction upon the four 
freedoms.   
In the case of Henn and Darby, the ECJ examined a measure having 
the equivalent effect of a quantitative restriction but which was purportedly 
justified on public policy grounds under Article 30 EC. The appellants had 
imported pornographic films and magazines deemed by the UK authorities 
to be obscene. The questions of Community law arose as a result of criminal 
proceedings brought against the appellants for having imported the material in 
question. Whilst not mentioning a ‘margin of appreciation’ by name, the ECJ 
went on to state that:
‘Under the terms of Article 36 [now Art. 30] of the Treaty the provi-
sions relating to the free movement of goods within the Community are 
not to preclude prohibitions on imports which are justified inter alia 
“on grounds of public morality”. In principle, it is for each Member 
State to determine in accordance with its own scale of values and in the 
21. Joined Cases C-267/91 & C-268/91 Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR 
I-6097
22. T. Connor, ‘Accentuating the Positive: The “Selling Arrangement”, the First Decade and Beyond’ 
(2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 127; A. Kaczorowska, ‘Gourmet Can Have 
his Keck and Eat It!’ (2004) 10 European Law Journal 479.
23. For example the prohibition on ‘Sunday trading’ in the UK in Case C145/88 Torfaen BC v. B&Q 
Plc [1989] ECR 3851; A. Arnull, ‘What Shall We Do on Sunday’ (1991) 16 European Law Review 
112. 
24. See generally Jans (note 4). 
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form selected by it the requirements of public morality in its territory 
[…].’25
The national authorities were therefore allowed some discretion to interfere 
with the free movement of goods deemed immoral. The language in which the 
ECJ expressed itself is highly reminiscent of that used by the ECtHR to justify 
conceding a margin of appreciation in cases such as Handyside. 
The approach of the ECJ to public policy in the context of restrictions to 
the free movement of workers under Article 39(3) EC and Directive 64/221 
has raised the same issue, and even more clearly follows the language of the 
ECtHR. In the Van Duyn case, the ECJ, whilst stressing that the concept of 
public policy cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State, em-
phasised that:
‘the particular circumstances justifying recourse to the concept of public 
policy may vary from one country to another and from one period to 
another, and it is therefore necessary in this matter to allow the compe-
tent national authorities an area of discretion within the limits imposed 
by the Treaty.’26
This reference to an ‘area of discretion’ plays the same role as the reference to 
a ‘margin of appreciation’ in the human rights cases discussed above. The use 
of the ‘area of discretion’ in Van Duyn again evidences the reluctance of the 
ECJ to impose one standard over pre-existing nationally constructed values.27 
Indeed, the precise words used by the ECJ to describe its practice should not 
provide a distraction since both the ECJ and the ECtHR operate in more than 
one language. In English, the terminology varies, with the ECtHR sometimes 
specifically referring to an ‘area of discretion’28 or a ‘power of appreciation’29 
in place of a ‘margin of appreciation.’ 
The national margin of appreciation is also visible when the ECJ examines 
case law exceptions. The Gambelli case concerned an Italian law regulating 
the gambling industry, and which was deemed a restriction on free movement 
contrary to Article 43 EC and not justified by reference to Articles 45 or 46 
25. Case C-34/79 R v. Henn & Darby [1979] ECR 3795, para. 15.
26. Case 41/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 1337, para. 18; note that this case was decided 
before the ECtHR gave its judgment in Handyside although the principles enunciated therein had 
been detectible in the jurisprudence of the Court and Commission (of human rights) for some 
time: Hall (note 3) 481.
27. D. Pollard, ‘Rights of Free Movement’ in N Neuwahl & A Rosas (eds.) The European Union and 
Human Rights (Kluwer, The Hague, 1995), 114.
28. Weeks v. UK Series A No. 114 (1988) 10 EHRR 293, para. 52.
29. De Wilde & Others v. Belgium Series A No. 12 (1979–80) EHRR 373, para. 93.
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EC.30 Introducing its advice to the referring court on the application of case 
law justifications in the general public interest, the ECJ stated that:
‘moral, religious and cultural factors, and the morally and financially 
harmful consequences for the individual and society associated with gam-
ing and betting, could serve to justify the existence on the part of the 
national authorities of a margin of appreciation sufficient to enable them 
to determine what consumer protection and the preservation of public 
order require’.31
Finally, the area of discretion is also visible in relation to the recently recog-
nised human rights derogation from the free movement of goods. In the 
Schmidberger case,32 the ECJ saw that the national court had to balance free 
movement of goods against free expression.33 The ECJ recognised that neither 
free movement of goods nor freedom of expression is an absolute right. In 
some cases, protecting free expression might justify restraining the free move-
ment of goods, and vice versa. The ECJ stated that the national courts would 
have to regard all the circumstances of the case in order to determine whether 
a fair balance was struck between the competing rights at stake. However, in 
that regard, the ECJ recognised that the competent national authorities would 
have a ‘wide margin of discretion’, subject to the restriction’s necessity and 
proportionality.34 
The cases presented here show that both courts have justified a moral or 
cultural margin of appreciation in similar terms. Following from the implica-
tions that the margin of appreciation doctrine has had for the ECtHR, it is sug-
gested that in the heartland of its substantive law the ECJ has been presented 
with complex questions about the relationship between the overlapping values 
of the EU and its Member States. 
Before examining the margin of appreciation doctrine in the internal mar-
ket in more detail, we need to consider several other instances in which the ECJ 
and Advocates General make reference to a ‘margin of appreciation’.
30. Case C-243/01 Criminal Proceedings against Gambelli [2003] ECR I-1577, para. 59–62
31. Ibid. para. 63; on gambling, free movement and the margin of appreciation see also the cases of 
Schindler, Läärä and Zenatti, discussed further in the text at note 113 below.
32. Case C-112/00 Schmidberger v. Austria [2003] ECR I-5659; see also Case C-36/02 Omega Spiel-
hallen- und Automatenaufitellungs-GmbH v. Oberbiirgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR 
I-9609.
33. The ECJ had followed the AG’s advice that it was the purpose of the authorities in allowing the 
demonstration (human rights), and not the purpose of the demonstration itself (environmental 
concerns), that formed the grounds for justification. Schmidberger, Ibid. para. 66–69.
34. Ibid. para. 82 
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2.5. Functionally Distinct References to a ‘Margin of Appreciation’
 The focus of this article is upon instances where, by virtue of the case involving 
a Member State’s limitation of one of the four freedoms, local values are put in 
apparent opposition to European policies. The emergency powers that Member 
States have to intervene in the internal market are, therefore, comparable but 
will not be discussed because of their infrequent use.35 Matters such as the 
review of Member States’ discretion in how to fulfil their obligations (such as 
under a directive)36 or to enforce Community law37 are related but distinct; 
these might be labelled more precisely as instances of ‘implementation discre-
tion’ flowing from the institutional structure of Community law rather than 
the nature of public policy or morals.38 
The precise jurisdictional context in which national measures are reviewed 
is relevant here as well. In enforcement proceedings under Article 226 or 227, 
the situation in Community law is directly comparable to European human 
rights law; the ECJ will determine conclusively whether the national measure 
infringes Community law. However, under Article 234, the ECJ hands the case 
back to the referring court to apply the test of proportionality.39 This, it is 
submitted, is a further instance of discretion left to the national courts, which 
is conferred only after a decision on the width of the appropriate margin is 
taken. The relationship between the margin of appreciation and the principle 
of proportionality is discussed in Part Four below. 
The ECJ has also used the term ‘margin of appreciation’ when reviewing 
the legality of Community legislation.40 Here, although complex moral or so-
cial choices may influence the ECJ to be less strict in its review, it is ultimately 
35. Articles 297–298 EC; see P, Koutrakos, ‘Is Article 297 a “Reserve of Sovereignty”’ (2000) 37 
Common Market Law Review 1339; In the TECE Arts 297–298 are replicated at Articles III-131 
to 132.
36. E.g. Case C-7/90 Vandevenne and Others 1991 ECR I-4371, para. 11; Case C-383/92 Commission 
v. United Kingdom 1994 ECR I-2479, para. 40.
37. E.g. in relation to competition law, such as AG Tizzano in Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & 
Co OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] 4 CMLR 28, paras 87 and 89.
38. On this point see S. Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights (Human Rights Files No. 17) (Council of Europe Publishing, 
2000), 15 & 22; J. Schokkenbroek, ‘The Basis, Nature and Application of the Margin of Apprecia-
tion Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (1998) 19 Human Rights 
Law Journal 30, 32.
39. T. Tridimas, ‘Proportionality in European Community Law: Searching for the Appropriate 
Standard of Scrutiny’ in E. Ellis (ed.), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart, 
Oxford, 1999) 65, 77 et seq; an exception was Case C-169/91 Council of the City of Stoke-on-Trent 
and Norwich City Council v. B & Q Plc discussed in Jans (note 4) 248. [1992] ECR I-6635
40. E.g. Case 5/88 Wachauf v. Bundesamt fur Ernahrung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 2609, para. 
22 (on regulations); Case C-166/98 SOCRIDIS [1999] ECR I-3791, para. 19 (on directives).
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respect for the Community legislature (via the principle of non-substitution)41 
rather than respect for national culture that motivates the ECJ. The broad 
separation of powers issues presented here are more akin to those familiar from 
domestic administrative law.42 
A margin of appreciation has also been visible in determining the direct 
effect of secondary legislation,43 and when reviewing the discretion of Com-
munity institutions.44 These cases did not raise the central issue of overlap 
between national public policy or morals and European aims, and are also more 
directly comparable to domestic administrative law. 
3. A Margin of Appreciation in the Internal Market: Setting the 
 Normative Context
3.1. ‘European’ and ‘National’ Cultures in the EU 
The ECtHR’s use of the margin of appreciation doctrine has been controversial 
because of perceptions that it undermines the universality of human rights.45 
This issue has been particularly pressing in the post-Cold War era.46 The 
implication for the ECJ is not that universality as such is at risk, but rather the 
functioning of the internal market and the idea of Europe upon it is based.47 
The opposing risk is that the ECJ’s concentration on the ‘unification and pri-
macy of EC law’ would lead to a reduced role for the margin of appreciation, 
giving insufficient attention to Member States’ national cultures and other 
countervailing factors such as human rights.48 
The constituent treaties of the EC and EU tread an awkward line between 
emphasising ‘European’ identity and respecting national cultures. In response 
41. Y. Arai-Takahashi, ‘“Scrupulous but Dynamic” – the Freedom of Expression and the Principle of 
Proportionality Under European Community Law’ (2005) 24 Yearbook of European Law 27, 36.
42. Discussed at section 2.1 above.
43. In both Case C-164/90 Muwi Bouwgroep BV v. Staatssecretaris van Financien [1991 ECR I-06049 
and Case C-100/89 Kaefer and Procacci v. France [1990] ECR I-4647 the Advocates General 
examined whether the “margin of appreciation” left by a directive prevented it from being “un-
conditional”. 
44. E.g. in the airport noise pollution case, Case C-27/00 R v. Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd [2002] ECR I-2569 para. 66.
45. E.g. E. Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards’ (1999) 31 New 
York University Journal of International Law 843, 844.
46. P. Mahoney, ‘Speculating on the Future of the Reformed European Court of Human Rights’ 
(1999) 20 Human Rights Law Journal 1, 3; Brems (note 9) 310; cf Sweeney (note 9). 
47. G. Chu, ‘“Playing at killing” Freedom of Movement’ (2006) 33 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 
85, 94.
48. Douglas-Scott (note 5) 650.
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to the increasing economic and cultural heterogeneity between Member States, 
some form of variable geometry has come to play a role in the EU’s legislative 
process. Flexibility or closer co-operation,49 therefore, has already raised im-
portant questions about commonality and fragmentation in the EU.50  
The present Article 3(1)(q) EC states that one of the activities of the EC is 
to contribute ‘to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States’ [emphasis 
added]. The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (‘TECE’) proclaims 
in Article I-3 (3) that: 
“[The Union] shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and 
shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.” 
[Emphasis added.]
The two treaties stress something slightly different; one promotes the ‘culture’ 
in so far as it belongs to Member States, whilst the other sees the Union itself 
as possessed of culture.
The impact of this apparent change of emphasis is difficult to gauge. 
Elsewhere the attitudes in the two treaties remain similarly ambivalent on the 
question of whether to protect ‘European’ or national culture. Article 151(1) 
EC, the language of which is replicated in Article III-280(1) TECE, states that 
the aim of promoting Member State cultures should be achieved, 
‘[…] while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same 
time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.’51 [Emphasis 
added.]
At the same time as committing itself to preserving national and regional di-
versity, the EU’s attempts to identify or construct an identity for itself assume 
a pre-existing common cultural heritage on which it seems increasing emphasis 
should be placed.
Nevertheless, Article 151 (4) EC attempts to ‘mainstream’ the importance 
of cultural diversity, stating that:
‘The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action 
under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and 
to promote the diversity of its cultures.’52
49. Formally incorporated in the Community law by the Amsterdam Treaty and revised at Nice in 
Arts 40, 43–45 TEU; Art 11 EC.
50. S. Douglas-Scott Constitutional Law of the European Union (Pearson Harlow, 2002), 187 et seq; 
I. Ward, A Critical Introduction to European Law (2nd edn, LexisNexis, London, 2003), 56–60.
51. This language is replicated in Article III-280(1) TECE.
52. The TECE contains almost identical language in Article III-280(4). 
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This provision has played a negligible role in the judgments of the ECJ on 
restrictions to the four freedoms,53 but, nevertheless, its existence provides a 
treaty-based backdrop against which to argue that a margin of appreciation is 
‘genetically coded’ into the Community aquis, like other judge-made principles 
of Community law.54 Indeed, it puts the existence of a moral or cultural 
margin of appreciation on a firmer legislative footing than in respect of the 
European Convention on Human Rights where the only sign that a margin of 
appreciation might be appropriate is the open-ended language used to define 
the rights and limitations themselves.55 
3.2. Rights, Public Interests and Essential Contestation
Although what is ultimately at stake for the ECtHR and the ECJ differs (the 
universality of human rights or the functioning of the internal market), the 
types of diversity recognised by the margin of appreciation are of the same 
order. In the Convention system, the balance is between public interests and 
human rights.56 In the EU, it is between public interests and economic 
freedoms. In neither system does the state that relies upon the public inter-
est-motivated restriction challenge the relevance of human rights in general to 
their society, or their overall commitment to the internal market. Paul Ma-
honey, who is now the registrar of the ECtHR, has observed that to recognise 
‘legitimate cultural diversity’ via the margin of appreciation is not the same 
as cultural relativism.57 Eva Brems suggests that the doctrine gives a merely 
corrective role to local values; it is a ‘limited counterbalance to the general 
universalist rule.’58 
Indeed, the real problem for states is squaring their particular ground for 
restriction with the general and overarching benefits that accrue from participa-
tion in each system. It is here where the margin of appreciation is relevant, with 
an assumption common to both systems not only that public interests have 
different weights (and content) from place to place and from time to time but 
also that these differences should be respected. 
53. In Bosman, the ECJ actually appeared to deny the relevance of Art 151 EC (then Art 128) to 
determining the scope of the fundamental freedoms (Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 
para. 78), although its reasoning is scant.
54. G. F. Mancini, Democracy and Constitutionalism in the European Union (Hart, Oxford, 2000), 
44; questions about the activism of the ECJ and its legitimacy are briefly addressed in section 4.1 
below.
55. P. Mahoney, ‘Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?’ (1998) 19 Hu-
man Rights Law Journal 1, 2; Arai-Takahashi (note 7) 238; Brems (note 9) 294 notes that this type 
of margin left by legislation is something with which all courts have to deal.
56. Greer (note 38) 32.
57. Ibid.
58. Brems (note 9) 310.
A ‘Margin of Appreciation’ in the Internal Market
39
It is conceded that occasionally both courts have allowed a margin as re-
gards the definition of the right in question, rather than on the question of 
balancing it against another public interest.59 This is problematic because, 
although the responsibility for applying the law is shared between national and 
international bodies (hence the margin of appreciation), the responsibility for 
interpreting it is solely the province of the relevant European court.60 Any 
other approach could indeed signal challenges to the universality of human 
rights, and would allow the ECJ to abdicate control over EU-wide definitions 
that are integral to the internal market.  
In Community law, the impact of morals upon the definition of free move-
ment rights has tended not to present these risks. One area where this issue has 
arisen is whether particular allegedly immoral acts can constitute an ‘economic 
activity’ such as abortion in Grogan61 or prostitution in Jany,62 thus engag-
ing the freedom to provide and receive services. The ECJ has stated that ‘it is 
not for the Court to substitute its own assessment for that of the legislatures of 
the Member States where an allegedly immoral activity is practised legally’.63 
In practice, the definitional margin of appreciation in these cases, which allows 
for the possibility of allegedly immoral activities being differently regulated 
across the EU, actually works against the Member State attempting to restrict 
free movement. In Jany, it is used as a step towards demonstrating that a host 
state cannot take action against non-nationals that it does not take against its 
own.64 In Grogan, it is used simply to remove the need for argumentation 
‘on the moral plane’ as to whether Member States should allow abortion to 
be lawfully practiced.65 Although expressed in terms of deference to Member 
States’ own scale of values, this type of margin thus masks the promotion of the 
internal market. Indeed its effects only make it more important that national 
characteristics are taken seriously at the stage of justification.
It is also preferable in legal terms to concentrate on the reasons for restric-
tion because the definition stage, as Jarass put it, does not involve the ‘weigh-
ing up of colliding public goods’ whereas the justification stage more easily 
facilitates the valuable proportionality test.66 This was precisely the approach 
taken by Advocate General Van Gerven in Grogan. 
59. Vo v. France (2005) 40 EHRR 12 is a recent and controversial example from the European Court 
of Human Rights.
60. P. van Dijk and G. van Hoof, Theory and practice of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Kluwer, The Hague, 1998), p. 71 et seq.
61. Case C-159/90 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v. Stephen Grogan and 
others [1991] ECR I-4685.
62. Case C-268/99 Jany and Others v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2001] ECR I-8615.
63. Ibid. para. 56.
64. Ibid. para. 60, following Joined Cases 115/81 and 116/81 Adoui and Cornuaille [1982] ECR 
1665.
65. Grogan (note 61) para. 20.
66. Jarass (note 19) 155.
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The characteristic weighing up of ‘national’ and ‘European’ values facili-
tated by the margin of appreciation at the justification stage reflects that the 
EU is comprised of several interlocking normative spheres.67 The sphere of 
Member States’ normatively ‘thin’ commitment to the internal market, includ-
ing guaranteeing the four freedoms and prohibiting distortions to competition, 
exists in conjunction with the sphere of their normatively ‘thick’ and multitu-
dinous national public policies. 
Values begin ‘thickly’, located in particular societies.68 They become 
refined and expressed thinly in times of stress. In this way, the thin com-
mitment to the internal market can be seen as being borne originally out of 
functionalist concerns about rebuilding Europe and preventing further conflict 
after World War Two. It is because thickly constituted values are the starting 
place for European integration that the ECJ rightly allows a margin within 
which their continued presence is accommodated.  The challenge is to see the 
relationship between interlocking normative spheres not as a crisis, but as part 
of the everyday life of a EU that is essentially contested and thus in a constant 
state of flux.69 
After the Grogan case, at least one commentator called for the adoption of 
a European morality directive to ‘unite the disparate approaches to moral issues 
in the Member States’.70 Such an approach is impractical and would fail to 
deal with the ongoing, evolutive and nuanced reality of Europe’s interlocking 
moralities. By attempting to solve the issue once and for all, in advance, it goes 
further than is necessary and therefore also violates the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality. 
In contrast, the jurisprudence of the ECJ on ‘margins of appreciation’, 
with its discussion of complex inter-related factors that might justify a national 
restriction, is capable of capturing the essentially contested essence of the EU. 
67. Z. Bańkowski and E. Christodoulidis, ‘The European Union as an Essentially Contested Project’ 
in Z. Bańkowski and A. Scott (eds) The European Union and its Order (Blackwell, Oxford, 2000), 
17. 
68. M. Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (University of Notre Dame 
Press, Notre Dame, 1994), 4; on applying Walzer’s work to human rights and the margin of ap-
preciation doctrine see J. Chan, ‘Thick and Thin Accounts of Human Rights: Lessons from the 
Asia values debate’ in M. Jacobsen and J. Bruun (eds) Human Rights and Asian Values (Curzon, 
Richmond, 2000), R. Mullender, ‘Human Rights: Universalism and Relativism’ (2003) 6 Critical 
Review of International and Social Political Philosophy 70; J. A. Sweeney, ‘Human Rights, Cultural 
Dialogue and the Margin of Appreciation’ Human Rights Law Review Student Supplement 2000–
2001 (University of Nottingham Human Rights Law Centre, 2001); J. A. Sweeney, Human Rights, 
Cultural Relativity and the European Court of Human Rights (PhD Thesis on file at the University 
of Hull, 2003); Sweeney (note 9).
69. Z. Bańkowski and E. Christodoulidis (note 67) 18.
70. D. O’Connor, ‘Limiting ‘Public Morality’ Exceptions to Free Movement in Europe: Ireland’s Role 
in a Changing European Union’ (1997) 22 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 695, 733.
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It allows the impulses of European commonality and national particularism 
visibly to interact but never fully to defeat each other. Moreover, demonstrat-
ing a commitment to local values and conditionally devolving the balancing of 
these overlapping values to national institutions via the margin of appreciation 
doctrine reiterates a commitment to subsidiarity allowing the balancing of 
overlapping values to take place withing national institutions via the margin of 
appreciation doctrine reiterates a commitment to subsidiarity.71
The notion of subsidiarity thus is used here not in its political and faintly 
Euro-sceptic sense, but as a means of internalising the questions of sovereignty 
raised by the jurisdiction of the ECJ. The notion of subsidiarity suggests some 
degree of loyalty to or (at least) a relationship with a central norm whereas 
relativism challenges the application of the norm outright. The internalisation 
and normalisation of questions about commonality and fragmentation, about 
‘European’ identity and national public policies, becomes a reflection of the 
EU’s nature. According to this view, there is no longer a series of individual 
and bi-polar conflicts between Member States and the EU, but a continual 
series of structured interactions along the subsidiarity continuum within a 
healthy and diverse EU. 
It is against this normative background, which values diversity, subsidiarity 
and a dynamic approach to European identity and national public policies, that 
the practice of the ECJ is now examined. The two most important issues here 
are the existence of the margin’s outer limits and some principles to guide its 
width in particular cases. 
4.  The Margin of Appreciation in Operation
4.1. The Margin’s Outer Limits in Historical Context
The margin of appreciation doctrine is poised to play an important role, but 
whether it can do so in practice remains to be seen. If we are to maintain the 
position that the doctrine does not threaten underlying notions of European 
commonality, then it must be shown to have outer limits. This, in turn, de-
pends upon the authority and legitimacy of the court imposing the limits. In 
the human rights context, the existence of such limits has been questioned, with 
the implication that the doctrine might lead states to resist review altogether on 
certain questions.72 An historical analysis of the doctrine’s use by the ECtHR 
suggests that there are in fact outer limits to it, but that for strategic reasons 
they were more difficult to perceive in its early period of operation.  
71. L. Gormley, ‘Pay Your Money and Take Your Chance’ (1994) 19 European Law Review 644, 650; 
O’Leary and Fernandez-Martin (note 20) 413.
72. Benvenisti (note 45) 844.
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The ECtHR’s early use of the margin of appreciation doctrine appeared 
highly deferential, but this was a tactical response to the ‘fragile foundations’73 
upon which the system was based. The doctrine’s early use represented a 
conscious strategy based upon the ECtHR’s self-preservation.74 The ECtHR 
sought to prevent ‘damaging confrontations’75 with Member States during 
the time when its jurisdiction and the right of individual petition were op-
tional76 and the memory of the Greek denunciation of the Convention was 
fresh.77 Whilst its continued use is not justified for these reasons alone,78 the 
margin of appreciation doctrine played a valuable role during the Convention 
system’s consolidation. However, once the system had matured, the doctrine 
was transformed from a transitional and rhetorical tool into one that allowed 
the ECtHR to require increasingly detailed justifications from Contracting 
Parties where they sought to limit human rights. Although, even in its early 
jurisprudence, the ECtHR was keen to demonstrate that its review functions 
were not ousted by reference to the margin of appreciation doctrine,79 cases 
such as Sunday Times v UK80 in 1979 mark a point at which the ECtHR 
took on a more consciously assertive role81 and articulated outer limits to the 
width of the margin.  
The ECJ, by contrast, has not had to work quite so intensely or indepen-
dently to establish its own legitimacy; this has been established and maintained 
alongside other developments in European integration.82 This is to not say 
that questions about the ECJ’s legitimacy have not arisen,83 but that they 
are often separate to questions about the legitimacy of the EU project itself. 
Indeed, the ECJ’s propensity for activism was probably more visible in its 
73. R. St. J. Macdonald, ‘The Margin of Appreciation’ in R St J Macdonald et al (eds.) The European 
System for the Protection of Human Rights (Kluwer, The Hague, 1993), 123.
74. Brems (note 9) 297.
75. Ibid.
76. Protocol 11, which came into effect in 1998 altered the Convention system in both respects; 
N. Brazta and M. O’Boyle, ‘The Legacy of the Commission to the New Court Under the Eleventh 
Protocol’ (1997) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 211; A. Drzemczewski, ‘The Internal 
Organisation of the European Court of Human Rights: The Composition of Chambers and the 
Grand Chamber’ (2000) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 233; N. Rowe and V. Schlette, 
‘The Protection of Human Rights in Europe After the Eleventh Protocol to the ECHR’ (1998) 
23 European Law Review, Supp HRS 3.  
77. Greece left the Convention system in 1969, when several Contracting Parties sought to bring 
inter-state actions following the Greek Colonels’ assumption of power in 1967. Greece re-joined 
the ECHR system in 1974 after the Colonels’ dictatorship fell; M. Janis et al (note 11) 61–63.
78. Arai-Takahashi (note 7) 232.
79. Handyside v. UK (note 15) para. 49.
80. Sunday Times v. UK (note 14).
81. Yourow (note 7) 56; Jones (note 10) 437. 
82. Of which the debate surrounding the TECE is just one; A Estella, ‘Constitutional Legitimacy and 
Credible Commitments in the European Union’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 22. 
83. The parameters of the debate about ECJ’s activism are sketched in Douglas-Scott (note 50) 210 
et seq. 
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early jurisprudence than at present.84 The use of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine by the ECJ has therefore continually been more reminiscent of the 
stricter post-1979 jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Even in the 1974 Van Duyn 
case, where the ECJ ultimately allowed a rather wide margin of appreciation, 
it had emphasised that,
‘the concept of public policy in the context of the Community and 
where, in particular, it is used as a justification for derogating from the 
fundamental principle of freedom of movement for workers, must be 
interpreted strictly, so that its scope cannot be determined unilaterally by 
each Member State without being subject to control by the institutions 
of the Community.’85 
The rhetorical or transitional use of the margin of appreciation doctrine is 
tied to the circumstances of the court that applies it. The conditions that gave 
rise to deference in the early jurisprudence of the ECtHR do not apply to the 
ECJ, and so the doctrine’s use within the EU has sufficiently clear outer-limits 
to guard against fragmentation. In addition, this author has argued elsewhere 
that the ECtHR has not returned to its earlier, more deferential ways in respect 
of the states from central and Eastern Europe.86 Indeed, in the light of the 
success of earlier efforts to establish its legitimacy, the ECtHR has been able to 
maintain a stricter line with the new Contracting Parties than with the original 
ones.87 This is worth considering as the EU continues its own enlargement.  
4.2. Proportionality and Standards of Review
If we can accept that there are outer limits to the margin of appreciation, then 
we must begin to examine the factors that might guide its width. This is, by 
no means, uncontroversial. In the human rights context, the margin of ap-
preciation has been criticised for lacking standards for its application88 or, in 
the alterative, of tending to promote double standards.89 Even the doctrine’s 
coherence as a viable legal doctrine has been challenged.90 Whilst broadly sup-
84. Douglas-Scott (note 50) 219 et seq.
85. Van Duyn v. Home Office (note 26) para. 18. 
86. Sweeney (note 9) 467–469 
87. M. Dembour and M. Krzyzanowska-Mierzewska, ‘Ten Years On: The Voluminous and Interesting 
Polish Case Law’ (2004) European Human Rights Law Review 517, 517; J. A. Sweeney, ‘Divergence 
and Diversity in Post-Communist European Human Rights Cases’ (2005) 21 Connecticut Journal 
of International Law 1, 22.
88. A. Lester, ‘Universality Versus Subsidiarity: a Reply’ (1998) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 
73, 76
89. Benvenisti (note 45) 844.
90. Greer (note 38), 32; R. Higgins, ‘Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties’ (1976–1977) 48 
British Yearbook of International Law 281, 315.
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porting the pragmatic or rhetorical role fulfilled by the doctrine, the influential 
writer and former judge of the ECtHR, Ronald St. J. Macdonald has argued 
that it is difficult to see a common denominator in its various applications.91 
De Búrca has identified a similar generic problem for the ECJ, and O’Leary 
and Fernández-Martin have discussed it with specific reference to the judicially 
created exceptions to the free provision of services. The latter have questioned 
the existence of guidelines for the ECJ to follow in order to determine whether 
a case has sufficiently sensitive moral or ethical issues for ‘proportionality not 
to apply’.92 However, it is submitted that the real problem for the ECJ is not 
whether to apply the proportionality principle at all, but which proportionality 
test to apply.93 
The idea of a relationship between proportionality and differing standards 
of review is already well recognised in the jurisprudence of the ECJ.94 When 
the factors at stake involve mediation between local and European values, it 
is appropriate for the ECJ to form conclusions as to the width of the national 
margin to be permitted. In some circumstances, the factors will combine in such 
a way that the ECJ will allow a wide margin of appreciation for Member States 
to assess measures themselves. This does not prove that the proportionality test 
was never applied.95 It simply demonstrates that depending on the  prima facie 
margin permitted in the case, and the reasons adduced for conceding it, a dif-
ferent threshold must be passed for the measure to be proportionate.  
Enhanced engagement with the margin of appreciation doctrine provides 
a structure upon which to hang a discussion of factors relevant to the level 
of scrutiny to be applied by the ECJ in particular cases.96 This encourages 
a degree of specificity from national governments, ensuring that they identify 
exactly which national interests are at stake and thereby facilitates an assessment 
of whether the measures taken go beyond what is needed to protect them.97 
Consequently, this would discourage the sort of over-broad restriction that 
might seem to undermine the idea of the internal market.98 Although often 
expressed as a conclusion ex post facto that a state’s actions were or were not 
within its margin of appreciation, finding the width of the margin is thus an 
91. Macdonald (note 73) 122.
92. O’Leary and Fernandez-Martin (note 20) 192.
93. Jans, (note 4) 263, likewise argues that ‘there is no such thing as the application of the proportion-
ality principle’. [Emphasis as per the original].
94. Craig and de Búrca (note 20) 373; G. Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of Interna-
tional Human Rights Law’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 38, 55 who equates 
gradation in the standards of review with subsidiarity. 
95. Craig and de Búrca (note 20) 379. 
96. Cf Arai-Takahashi (note 7) 193; Arai-Takahashi (note 41) 51.
97. Davies (note 25) 113.
98. See Chu’s discussion of whether ‘human dignity’ in Omega Spielhallen (note 32) (discussed further 
at note 118 below) was a specific enough aim to justify restricting free movement of services; Chu 
(note 47).
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intrinsically valuable pre-requisite step to applying a test of proportionality and 
arriving at such a conclusion. Such an approach is particularly useful in deter-
mining the advice to be given to a national court under Article 234, concerning 
the application of proportionality test in its strict sense.99   
The task for the ECJ is therefore to chart relevant factors for deciding upon 
the width of the margin and to engage with Member States on the question of 
their relative weight, with particular care when morally or culturally resonant 
issues are to the fore. 
4.3. The Width of the Margin of Appreciation 
For both courts, factors relevant to the width of the margin have included 
which right is being restricted, the context in which the right it is invoked, 
and which legitimate aim (reason for restriction) is pursued.100 Both also use 
some comparative methodology in order to consider the impact of European 
consensus on the issue. In this section, the focus is upon the role that human 
rights play within this matrix of factors, and on the question and relevance of 
European consensus. 
It is clear from the ERT case101 that restrictions to any of the internal 
market rights must, in order to be compatible with Community law, also be 
compatible with the Human Rights Convention.102 In particular, the human 
rights element to the free movement rights of workers suggests that restrictions 
to their exercise be treated very carefully, even where a cultural or moral inter-
est is asserted by the Member State. On the free movement of workers, there 
is a direct overlap between the jurisprudence of the ECJ and the ECtHR, as 
identified by Stephen Hall some time ago. His work examined the impact 
of Article 2 of the fourth protocol to the Human Rights Convention upon 
the interpretation of the then Article 48(3) EC (now Article 39(3) EC). Hall 
99. Ward, (note 50) 118–122, notes the inadequacy of the advice given to UK courts on the applica-
tion of the proportionality test in the ‘Sunday trading’ cases (note 23), resulting eventually in the 
Stoke-on-Trent case indicated at note 39 above.
100. On the ECJ see Gormley (note 71); G. de Búrca, ‘The Principle of Proportionality and its Ap-
plication in EC law’ (1993) 13 Yearbook of European Law 105, 111; Arai-Takahashi (note 41); 
On relevant factors for the Court of Human Rights see Arai-Takahashi (note 7) 206 et seq; Brems 
(note 9) 256 et seq and Mahoney (note 55) 5 et seq; van Dyke and van Hoof (note 60) 87 et 
seq. 
101. Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR 2925.
102. J. Coppel and A. O’Neill, ‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?’ (1992) 12 
Legal Studies 227 describe this case as an aspect of the ECJ’s ‘offensive’ use of human rights, in 
the sense that the ECJ actively pursued the protection of human rights. They contrast this with 
earlier cases where the ECJ relied in the idea of human rights ‘defensively’ in order to establish 
and maintain the supremacy of EC law (e.g. in Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
[1970] ECR 1125).  
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described the approaches of the two courts to assessing limitations upon free 
movement as ‘strikingly similar’.103 
Human rights, in these examples, promote internal market rights and corre-
spondingly limit the margin of appreciation. It is perhaps unsurprising that the 
ECJ would be most receptive to human rights protection (and least receptive 
to a national margin of appreciation) when it has a secondary effect of promot-
ing free movement within the internal market.104 We should be cautious 
of attempts to co-opt the idea of human rights as an excuse to prioritise free 
movement over free thinking.  
Interestingly, since the Schmidberger case, the protection of human rights 
in national law has been recognised as a legitimate public interest that might 
serve to limit the free movement of goods.105 In this sense, the presence of 
a human rights element can also widen the scope of the margin within which 
Member States can interfere with internal market rights. 
There is not space here to chart further the often-ambivalent approach of 
the ECJ to human rights.106 It is sufficient to show that the level of discre-
tion left to Member States to limit internal market rights is affected by the 
particular right that is claimed and the context in which it is exercised, includ-
ing any human rights elements. It is nevertheless important to disaggregate the 
two types of margin present where EC law overlaps with European human 
rights law; one relates to a margin within which internal market rights may 
be limited, and the other relates to limiting human rights. The width of the 
margin of appreciation given to the same countervailing public policy might 
be quite different depending upon whether the matter is seen as primarily a 
human rights or economic freedoms case.   
The aim pursued by the restrictive measure also plays a role in the way that 
the ECJ uses the margin of appreciation doctrine. The ECtHR is fairly explicit 
in this respect, and has compared the objectivity of different legitimate aims. 
For example, it has held that the aim of protecting the ‘authority of judiciary’ 
is more objectively determinable than the ‘protection of morals’.107 More re-
cently, the ECtHR has examined not only whether the restriction falls within a 
legitimate aim listed in the Convention, but also seems to have examined what 
103.  Hall (note 3) 481. 
104. See D. Phelan, ‘Right to Life of the Unborn v. Promotion of Trade in Services: The European 
Court of Justice and the Normative Shaping of the European Union’ (1992) 55 Modern Law 
Review 670.
105. See Schmidberger v. Austria, discussed in the text at note 32 above, and also Omega Spielhallen 
(note 32) discussed further at note 118 below.
106. Coppel and O’Neill (note 102); A. Toth, ‘The European Union and Human Rights: the Way 
Forward?’ (1997) 34 Common Market Law Review 491; K. Lenaerts and E. de Smijter, ‘A “Bill 
of Rights” for the EU’ (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 273.
107. Sunday Times (note 14) para. 59.
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the aim means in the context of the state putting it forwards.108 Although it 
was established above that the ECJ tends to leave a margin of appreciation in 
cases where the public policy or morality justification is motivated, this is still 
a factor that the ECJ could develop. For example, even within the realm of 
public policy and morals, if the specific aim is capable of a relatively objective 
assessment, and the State does not provide specific enough information to al-
low this to transpire, then the ECJ should apply a strict test of proportionality. 
In Lindman, the ECJ seemed already receptive to this approach.109    
Finally, both courts have undertaken comparative analysis of domestic legal 
systems in order to assist arriving at a conclusion.110 Where the ECtHR has 
found a Contracting Party to be in an isolated or outdated position, it has 
narrowed their margin of appreciation and made reference to the practice of 
the majority of Contracting Parties.111 However, where there is a lack of 
European consensus, the margin of appreciation tends to be correspondingly 
wider.112
The ECJ case of Schindler,113 which concerned non-discriminatory re-
strictions to the free provision of lottery services in the UK, shows the existence 
of consensus playing a slightly different role. Here the ECJ noted the ‘moral, 
religious and cultural aspects of lotteries’ and that the ‘general tendency of the 
Member States is to restrict, or even prohibit, the practice of gambling and 
to prevent it from being a source of private profit’.114 This, amongst other 
factors, justified national authorities having a ‘sufficient degree of latitude’ in 
how (and whether) to protect lottery players and society at large.115 Thus, 
the general consensus that such matters were appropriate for regulation due to 
their moral, religious and cultural implications resulted in an apparently wide 
margin of appreciation. 
In a line of cases since Schindler, the ECJ has stressed that the necessity and 
proportionality of a national restrictive measure will not be excluded simply 
because Member States do not share the same conception of the fundamental 
right or legitimate interest put forwards116 and, thus, have chosen a different 
108. Sweeney (note 87) 25 et seq.
109. Case C-42/02 Lindman [2003] ECR I-13519, para. 26.
110. F. Matsher, ‘Methods of Interpretation of the Convention’ in R St J Macdonald et al (eds) (note 
73) 74; van Dyke and van Hoof (note 60) 87; Brems (note 9) 279; Mahoney (note 55) 5.
111. E.g. on the persistence of corporal punishment on the Isle of Man in Tyrer v. UK Series A No. 
26 (1979–80) 2 EHRR 1. 
112. E.g. in X, Y and Z v. United Kingdom Reports 1997–II (1997) 24 EHRR 143 para. 44.
113. Case C-275/92 Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039.
114. Ibid., para. 60; cf Gambelli (note 30) para. 63, which does not make the same reference to the 
general tendencies of Member States but does use the term ‘margin of appreciation’ in place of 
‘sufficient degree of latitude’.
115. Ibid., para. 61.
116. Omega Spielhallen (note 32) para. 37.
James A. Sweeney
48 
system for protecting that right or interest.117 The approach was particularly 
clear in Omega Spielhallen,118 where the ECJ allowed a considerable ‘margin 
of discretion’119 within which Germany could restrict the free movement of 
services in order to protect its conception of human dignity.120  
A flexible approach to consensus analysis is to be welcomed because over-re-
liance upon consensus contains an inbuilt conservatism121 that can suppress 
minority voices,122 leading to difficult situations where one state maintains 
an isolated moral position.123 Nevertheless, consensus analysis may still play 
a legitimate role because it does not exist in isolation. As Mahoney argued, it 
is a ‘pointer’ that can be corroborated by other factors.124 
The broad factors sketched in this section work together so that a balance 
between them is struck. For example, where the importance of the right is 
particularly profound, then a lack of consensus may be of only peripheral value 
in assessing its restriction. Where the public interest motivated by the Member 
State is of exceptional importance and is raised with sufficient precision, this 
may outweigh that their position is at odds with a more general European 
consensus.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the operation of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine is complex. In the human rights context, it has been observed that 
even if factors can be regularly identified, at the very least, it is difficult to 
predict what conclusion the ECtHR will reach in a given case.125 The argu-
ment that the factors relevant to the width of the margin of appreciation are 
complex is thus more compelling than the argument that there is no standard 
for its application at all. However, as suggested in Part Three, the mere process 
of identifying and balancing the relevant factors is an end in itself and reflects 
the reality of an essentially contested EU. 
5. Conclusion
In this article, the use and potential of the margin of appreciation doctrine by 
the ECJ has been compared to its use by the ECtHR. The ultimate theme is 
not only that the doctrine is used by the ECJ, but that its examination can 
117. See Case C-124/97 Läärä [1999] ECR I-6067 para. 36; Case C-67/98 Zenatti [1999] ECR 
I-7289 para. 34; Case C-6/01 Anomar and Others 2003 ECR I-8621, para. 80.
118. Omega Spielhallen (n32) para. 38.
119. The term is introduced at para. 31.
120. See generally Chu (note 47).
121. Brems (note 9) 285.
122. Benvenisti (note 45) 850; Brems (note 9) 285.
123. Brems (note 9) 282; O’Leary and Fernandez-Martin (note 20) 93.
124. Mahoney (note 55) 5.
125. Van Dijk and van Hoof (note 60) 91.
A ‘Margin of Appreciation’ in the Internal Market
49
provide lessons leading to a deeper understanding of universality and particu-
larism in the EU.
The issues raised in this article have touched upon some major topics of EU 
law. These have included the nature and identity of the EU, the substantive 
Community law of the four freedoms, the activism of the ECJ and the concepts 
of subsidiarity and proportionality. The purpose here has been to link them to 
the common thread of universality and particularism, at a time when the EU 
has recently undergone its most radical expansion. It is vitally important that 
the EU recognises the impact that even the ECJ’s four freedoms jurisprudence 
has on the interaction of local and broader European values. The analysis of 
the case law presented here has suggested that the idea of a judicially recognised 
‘margin of appreciation’, where Member States’ morals and public policies 
come into conflict with free movement rights, can play an important role in 
an essentially contested EU.  
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